ON TOBACCO STATISTICS 1956 , at 41-42 (Stat. Bull. No. 200, 1957 (hereinafter cited as ANNUAL STATISTICS). Charges usually include a small fee per basket, plus a percentage commission on the gross sales price. Normally, the commission is the bulk of the warehouseman's income, running about $2.50 per basket as compared with a 25 cent handling fee.
5. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48, § 64-76 (1951) creates a State Tobacco Authority which sets opening dates for Maryland markets; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-465 (1953) recognizes the local tobacco boards of trade in each market town and gives them power to license buyers and warehousemen and to regulate trading. See text and notes at notes 91-108 infra. (568) controls. While governmental regulation is extensive and severely restricts the free play of economic forces in the tobacco market, two important aspects of the auction market process are, in the main, not affected-the manner of bringing together buyers and sellers in the auction warehouses and the day-to-day equating of supply with demand in the market.
Determination of these matters could be left to the undirected operation of the marketing process itself. In fact, however, the warehousemen have undertaken their regulation. Local tobacco boards of trade in each market town schedule and assign the hours during which each warehouseman can sell, and the belt associations determine the opening dates of the markets each season and regulate the daily rate and duration of sales, thus stabilizing the tonnage sold each day.
Although litigants still raise the issue, it is well settled that tobacco auction markets are a part of interstate commerce. 6 The great proportion of tobacco sold in an auction is grown in the state in which it is marketed, but the sale is followed by a general cross-movement of the tobacco from market to market and from state to state for processing and resale thereafter. 7 In Currin v. Wallace, 8 which upheld the validity of the Federal Tobacco Inspection Act of 1935 against the contention that the auctions were not in interstate commerce, the Supreme Court said, "Where goods are purchased in one State for transportation to another, the commerce includes the purchase quite as much as it does the transportation." 9 Since tobacco auctions are a part of interstate commerce, they come within the powers of federal regulation under the commerce clause, and so within the purview of the antitrust laws.' 0 It is the purpose of this Note to consider the antitrust implications of private regulation of tobacco marketing. Flue-cured, or bright, tobacco is grown in an area divided into five belts. Burley, on the other hand, is grown in an area which is treated as a unit. Nearly all warehousemen who sell bright belong to a trade association known as the Bright Belt Warehouse Association; burley warehousemen belong to a sister group, the Burley Auction Warehouse Association.' 2 These two belt associations set the dates upon which the warehouses of each belt will open and, through shortening the number of hours a market may be open or declaring a market holiday, stabilize the tonnage of tobacco sold each day.
Setting of Opening Dates
With the aid of growers and warehousemen, the belt associations attempt to set the opening dates for each belt to coincide with the curing of the bulk of the crop in that area. Bright is first sold in its southernmost belt, Georgia-Florida, about the middle of July; the selling period in the northernmost bright belt ends in November. CODE art. 48, § 70 (1951) .
13. Maryland tobacco is stored over the winter and sold the following spring. ANNUAL STATISTICS at 36-40. Thus, the various types of tobacco are sold in a cycle which occupies much of the year.
14. The short selling season is caused by the large number of market towns where sales take place-about ninety-five for flue-cured and fifty-five for burley. Most tobacco is thereby auctioned within twenty miles of the farm. Hendrickson, in AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVIcE, THE AUCTION MARKETING OF FLUE-CURED TOBACCO 8, 16 (Market Research Report No. 101, 1955) . In the 1946 case, American the prior belt has closed. Most tobacco is sold in a belt before the end of the fifth week, however, due to the belief on the part of the growers that buyers will satisfy their needs early, causing prices to fall thereafter in that belt.'
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Opening sales in each belt on an established date has an advantage for those participants in the auction process who work in each belt seriatim. For example, it is quite common for a warehouseman to operate warehouses in several belts.' 6 Having the warehouses open in each belt at fixed intervals rather than sporadically allows him to schedule his working force so that they can move north as the season progresses.
The major buyers 17 are also in a position to take advantage of simultaneous opening. At present, one buyer from each of the large domestic and foreign companies joins with the buyers from the others to make up a "set." This set of buyers moves as a unit from sale to sale in the warehouses of a market town and from belt to belt as the season progresses, bidding against smaller local buyers at each sale.' 8 Although a buyer anxious to buy as cheaply as possible would find it in his interest to have the warehouses open sporadically, since he might thereby be able to begin buying in a warehouse before his competitors arrive to bid up the price, the three major domestic buyers, who purchase about thirty-five per cent of the bright and sixty per cent of the burley, 19 will not bid at auction unless all are present.
2 0 This seeming paradox was brought to light in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 2 1 in which these companies were convicted of combining to monopolize the purchase of tobacco. One charge made was that the companies thereby attempted to keep prices so high that no cut-price cigarette manufacturers could survive. 93, 101 (6th Cir. 1944 93, 101 (6th Cir. ), aff'd, 328 U.S. 781 (1946 . 22. It was admitted by the companies that though they bid on the same tobacco, they intended only to be successful in buying certain types of tobacco sons underlying the propensity of the major companies to bid only if all are present, it would appear that the primary purpose of the belt associations in prescribing the dates for sales is to insure that a maximum number of buyers are present at all sales in all belts. To the extent that this causes more buyers to be present at some sales than would otherwise be the case, the result is a higher price for the grower and larger commissions for the warehousemen. The major buyers seem to believe that this system works to their advantage as well. If this be the case, however, it must follow that some other buyers are thereby placed at a disadvantage.
Tonnage Regulation
The same purpose is evident in the belt associations' programs of tonnage regulation of tobacco sales. Under this program, the burley and bright belt associations attempt to avoid a volume of sales per day larger than the redrying capacity of the major buyers so that no major buyer temporarily drops out of a sale. 23 Before cigarette tobacco can be put in storage, it must be heat treated, or "redried." In the case of flue-cured tobacco, this must be done within five days after curing, because bright wll spoil if it is kept in the moist condition in which it is sold for more than that time. To avoid this result one committee of the association sets the maximum number of baskets of tobacco which may be auctioned per set of buyers per hour. This is usually about four hundred baskets per hour, or one every nine seconds 27 Another committee obtains from the United States Department of Agriculture a daily report on the total pounds of tobacco of within each quality division. The reason given for the extra bidding was to assure that all the competitors paid a fair price. f126,448 (1957) (appeal to Comm'n pending). Therefore, the possibility that burley might spoil before it is redried is slight.
25. 244 F.2d 471, 473 n.3 (5th Cir. 1957) . 26. The main instance of crisis was at the outset of the second world war, when the foreign buyers suddenly left the market. At that time, market conditions depreciated so greatly that the tobacco state governors declared a market holiday. Tonnage regulation was carried out by a trade association of buyers until 1946, the year of the second Americam Tobacco decision, when the belt associations were formed.
27. In some markets, if the sale in a warehouse falls below a certain speed, the sales supervisor of the local tobacco board of trade will suspend the sale and move the buyers on to the next warehouse in line. their type (burley or bright) sold the previous day. This committee also receives reports from the major buyers if their facilities for redrying are temporarily full. If the committee believes, from these two sources, that a reduction in the rate of tobacco sales is necessary to avoid a major buyer's leaving the market, it can do one of two things-either notify the markets to reduce the number of selling hours per day or declare a market holiday, suspending all sales in the belt for one or more days.Ps Members who sell beyond the prescribed hours are penalized a fixed sum per pound of tobacco so sold. The effect of this regulation is not to reduce the total amount of tobacco that will be sold by a market or belt during a season, but merely to spread the sale over a longer period.
29

Establishment of Opening Dates and Tonnage Regulation as Restraints of Trade
Were opening dates for all sales not established by the warehousemen's associations, it seems fair to assume that some growers would be prepared and willing to sell their tobacco earlier than others and that some warehousemen would be desirous of opening their sales earlier than others. Moreover, it is likely that not all warehousemen and growers would suspend selling because of the withdrawal of one of the major buyers were it not for the belt association tonnage regulation program. Some buyers other than the major tobacco companies would probably favor the sporadic opening of markets and the continuation of sales in the absence of the major buyers because of the possibility of lower prices that might result.
30 It seems clear, therefore, that belt association regulation restrains trade to some degree for the purpose of avoiding the price depression that might occur were one of the major buyers to leave the market. Under the Standard Oil decision, 3 ' however, the conclusion that a practice restrains trade is not sufficient to find it illegal within the Sherman Act; further inquiry is necessary to determine whether the practice "unreasonably" restrains trade. (1957) . This is the maximum working day for the industry, because of the severe strain the auction puts on auctioneers and buyers alike.
29. Tobacco is usually stored for two or more years before it is used in the manufacture of cigarettes. Therefore preclusion of purchase on one day results merely in more being purchased at a later time.
30. This possible advantage is limited by stabilization, which guarantees the grower a price about ten per cent below the price that results when all buyers are actively bidding. an attempt by the major oil companies to stabilize the price of gasoline. Independent refiners were shipping gas into areas where there was insufficient demand. Under the NRA, the defendants united in a voluntary program to buy these "distress" shipments at prices slightly above those prevailing, in order to avoid lower prices for their own products. This program continued after the NRA was held invalid. Since mark-ups were standardized by price leadership, setting the price on the spot market effectively set the price on the retail market. 3 8 Prices in fact did rise while the program was in operation, but the defendants argued that this was due mainly to increased demand, general betterment of business conditions and an interstate compact which strengthened state proration laws. The Supreme Court, holding the program to be a per se violation, stated:
[I]n terms of market operations stabilization is but one form of manipulation. . . . Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of . . . stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se." 3 9
Thus Socony involved the establishment of a floor under the market at agreed levels, the purpose and effect of which was to raise prices; there was direct agreement to eliminate a type of price competition. In the case of the tobacco belt regulations, there is no such agreement on price levels or the elimination of a type of price competition, but the purpose and effect of the regulations is nevertheless to stabilize prices by preventing declines that would occur were sales conducted in the absence of major buyers. Direct agreement on prices or the elimination of a type of price competition is sufficient to invoke the per se rule, 4° but it is less clear that other agreements having an effect on price will suffice. 41 Both Standard Oil 42 and
Trenton Potteries 4 declared that the enhancement of prices was the ultihand-blown window glass industry who agreed to cut down and stagger their operating hours were held not to have violated the Sherman Act. Their justification was that the remaining supply of skilled workers was too small to permit continuous operation of all the plants. This indicates that production control falls within the per se rule only when its purpose is to affect prices or limit competition. both cast doubt on the basis of this argument, however. In the Board of Trade case defendants had adopted a rule requiring that all sales of "to arrive" grain made after the dosing of the exchange be at the last price registered on the exchange during trading hours. The Court concluded that the rule was merely a regulation of hours of trading rather than a pricefixing agreement, emphasizing that its effect was to increase the number of "to arrive" transactions taking place on the floor of the exchange, and thus to increase competition with respect to these transactions. 4 7 It seems probable that the purpose of the regulation was to restrict the ability of the big buyers, who previously had carried on business after exchange closing hours, to make contracts for grain at low, non-competitive prices; the competitive position of small dealers was thereby strengthened.
E.g.,
Although the tobacco program assures the warehouseman a full complement of competing buyers, it operates at the expense rather than for the benefit of the small buyers. Moreover, the price-raising effect in Board of Trade was found to be limited by the fact that the grain was sold in competition with grain sold other than "to arrive," and grain shipped to markets other than Chicago. 48 This safeguard is not present here, since the great bulk of tobacco is sold under some form of tonnage regulation.
In Morgan, defendant investment underwriters, through syndicates, would stabilize the market price of new issues during the flotation period by buying up offerings below the established price. In rejecting the contention that this constituted price fixing, the court held that the syndicates constituted legitimate joint ventures rather than conspiracies in restraint of trade.
4 9 It noted that the stabilization operations were temporary in nature and that stabilization constituted a traditional means of insuring the orderly distribution of securities, beneficial to all parties concerned.
5 0 It is difficult to conceive of the belt associations as being joint ventures, although the belt regulations otherwise bear some resemblance to the practices in Morgan in the sense that they represent temporary measures to insure price stability in the market. The influence of the Morgan dicta on future attempted applications of the per se doctrine is difficult to predict. Many factors appear to have entered into the court's speculation on validity, aside from the joint venture holding. The facts here being considered-the absence of a half-century of satisfactory operation, of express approval of a federal The effects of the regulation appear to justify such a presumption of unreasonableness. Putting aside the higher commissions which may inure to warehousemen, which cannot justify the restraint imposed, one justification for the regulation might be the higher prices which growers receive. However, it must be assumed that government price support gives the grower all the price protection which the public interest requires. Tonnage regulation permits economic utilization of redrying facilities by spreading the sale of tobacco over a longer period and synchronization of sales in the various belts reduces the number of overhead personnel required to conduct the sales.
51 But these benefits would seem to be outweighed by the fact that the prices the small buyer and the consumer must pay are probably raised
Further, belt association regulation limits the freedom of all in the market to sell or buy when they think conditions are most propitious, and places great power in the hands of people whose allegiance lies mainly with their biggest customers, the major buyers.
If belt regulation were held invalid, either of two results might follow. The states might take over regulation, as has already been done in Maryland 53 and, partially, in Georgia. 54 A federal statute authorizing interstate compacts 1 would permit regulation of a scope comparable to that of the belt associations. Such regulation would be more equitably responsive to the needs of all of the market participants, and to the general public as well. Alternatively, redrying facilities might be increased, obviating the need for any type of tonnage regulation at the belt level.
VALIDITY OF REGULATION BY LOCAL TOBAcco BOARDS OF TRADE
In each tobacco town there is a local tobacco board of trade composed mainly of warehousemen.
5 6 In addition to regulating such matters as the 51. Hendrickson, supra note 14, at 9. 52. Since tobacco represents only one-seventh of the final cost of a pack of cigarettes, the effect on the consumer is not nearly as pronounced as on the individual farmer whose tobacco might sell at stabilization price. However, the magnitude of the price effect is not determinative of reasonableness. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927 § 106-465 (1953) . This situation is discussed at pp. 584-85 infra. Prior to this enactment it had been held that such a requirement was unlawful. rejection and withdrawal of bids 5 and the prohibition of fraudulent practices, the boards of trade divide the selling time allotted to the market by the belt association among the local warehousemen. This includes establishing the length of time each warehouseman will sell and the sequence in which they will sell. During the selling season there is one auction taking place in the market for each set of buyers sent by the buying companies-as soon as the buyers have bought for the two or three hours allotted by the board to the first warehouse they move on as a unit to the second warehouse. After each warehouse in the market has had its turn, the sale returns to the first warehouse and the sequence is repeated. The time that a warehouseman is allotted directly affects his profits since the overhead of the warehouse, with its short selling season, must be prorated over the receipts from the tobacco he sells, and the more time he is allotted the more tobacco he can sell.
The principal reason, from the standpoint of the growers and warehousemen, for holding sales in succession rather than simultaneously is to insure that as many buyers as possible are present at each sale. Positing that sales are successive, there is a need for some method of revolving the sales among the members which will be orderly and authoritative. One consequence of successive sales is that warehouses do not attract the patronage of tobacco growers purely because of the services they offer; the warehouse which is next in line for sale, and has space and selling time available will get a certain amount of tobacco no matter how poor the service it offers.
The first antitrust problem created by time allocation arises from the fact that each board has an effective monopoly in the market in which it operates.
s The major buyers and most of the small ones go only to those warehouses to which the board has allotted selling time. And the growers will take their tobacco mainly to the warehouses these buyers frequent because they feel that prices will generally be higher there. Thus, while it is not impossible to have a sale without the sanction of the local board, the board is able to determine whether a given warehouse will have a successful Gray v 391 (1949) . In the latter case, certain warehousemen in Rocky Mount, North Carolina set up a sale schedule in addition to that set up by the local board. Big buyers were not in attendance but the warehousemen testified that there were no more "turned tags" or rejected bids than in the regular auctions. This may be due to the fact that there was excess tobacco in the area in relation to the selling time allowed to the market, and growers were willing to accept a lower price rather than truck the tobacco to another market. Cir. 1945) . Even in the absence of actual preclusion of competition, if monopoly power is coupled with an intent to preserve it, a violation of § 2 is made out. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) . Such intent can be inferred from actions, the natural consequence of which is to gather or maintain monopoly power. ATT'y GEN. REP, at 56. Further, where monopoly power has been obtained by combination, as in this case, it has been held that no showing of intent is necessary, since the individuals are not assumed to have combined without an intent to make use of the power they thereby attained. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946) ; see also Ar'y GEN. REP. at 61.
62. See note 4 supra. Kentucky does not subject warehousemen's charges to public regulation. However, the charges are identical throughout each market town. See ANNUAL STATISTIcs at 41-42. If these charges are set by agreement in a trade association, or even by two or more warehousemen in combination, they would seem to be clearly illegal under the per se doctrine. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) . Where agreement is absent, and the price is set in some way more in the nature of price leadership, the question of legality is not as clear. 248.290 (1953) . the antitrust standpoint adoption of the first alternative seems preferable to the other two. Of course, under the third alternative, positing that the state may lawfully restrict entry, 6 4 the question of entry ceases to be within the purview of the antitrust laws.
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Assuming the validity of time allocation in the abstract 16 and that new entrants are not barred, the method of time allocation adopted by the board becomes crucial and is presently the most litigated issue in the industry. Most tribunals that have dealt with the question have posited that allocation of selling time is valid so long as it does not unreasonably limit competitive merit. 0 7 Were there no system of successive sales and allocation of selling time, it would be expected that growers would bring their tobacco to the warehouseman who offered the best service, which includes attempting to get the best price for the tobacco. 68 A method of allocating selling time should therefore be adopted which departs as little as possible from this norm, i.e., which least discourages service competition. 25,808 (1955 25,808 ( ), aff'd by Commn, id. at 1126180 (1956 . All other cases have been instituted or instigated by warehousemen who were interested not in striking down the whole allocation program, but in getting more time allotted to themselves. Were the boards' time allocation activities to be struck down it is probable that one of the more primitive time allocation systems might be imposed by the buyers themselves, in view of their preference for travelling in a group. However, such a program might be vulnerable to antitrust proscription as a limited form of boycott.
Some 68. An employee of the warehouse bids along with the regular buyers when he feels the price does not reflect the true value of the tobacco. Sometimes this results in the warehouse's buying the tobacco itself. Growers appreciate the high price the warehouseman's bidding brings them. The warehouseman will, in turn, re-sort the tobacco and sell it the next day, making a profit.
69. This is not to say that the antitrust laws necessarily require that the system employed be the most nearly perfect one conceivable. Rather, there is probably an area of reasonableness. An example, perhaps extreme, of this at the state level is the fact that on the same day the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld both the "floor-space" and the "experience" system (discussed infra), against contentions that they unreasonably restrained trade. Systems of time allocation fall into four main categories and variations thereon.
The earliest was known as the "wall-to-wall" or "squirrel-cage" system. Under this system, the warehousemen draw lots to determine who is to have the first sale and who the second, etc. The buyers start at the warehouse which drew first sale and remain there until all the tobacco in the warehouse is sold. Then they go to the warehouse which drew second sale. This method of time allocation is no longer used in the flue-cured markets, but is still used to a certain extent in the burley and Maryland belts. 71 At first glance, this system would not seem to unduly impair competition, since it allows a warehouseman to sell as much tobacco as he can attract between and during sales. However, his sales are measured by the amount of tobacco he can get in his warehouse at one time. Since he knows that he will get a good percentage of incoming tobacco so long as his sale is going on and he has space to sell it, he will be encouraged to build a larger warehouse than is efficient or is needed on the market. 72 And if the warehouses are large, there is a possibility that the tobacco in other warehouses will spoil before the buyers get to it.
78 These problems would be alleviated only by a limit on size which would result in a program analogous to the floor-space system.
The floor-space system gives the warehouseman a proportion of the market's selling time equal to the ratio between his warehouse's (or warehouses') 74 floor area and the total floor space on the market. 25,808 (1955 25,808 ( ), aff'd by Comm'n, id. at 126,180 (1956 26,448 (1957) (appeal to Comm'n pending) (testimony by officials of the North Carolina Department of Agriculture that any of the systems will be satisfactory if they are not discriminatorily applied).
74. Under both the unit and the floor-space systems, it is usually possible for an owner to accumulate the time allotted to him for all his warehouses and use it in one warehouse. In this way he can use a smaller work force and use them more efficiently. 75. Floor space in warehouses ranges from 10,000 square feet (one-quarter acre) to 220,000 square feet (5 acres). Not all this space can be used in selling tobacco; system has the effect of freezing the competitive picture from season to season until there is a physical change in the market's floor space. There is some slight chance for a warehouseman to take advantage of his popularity, created by better service, through the "second sale" program. If one warehouseman has less tobacco attracted to his warehouse than he can sell in his allotted time the sale moves on to the next warehouse, and it will get the benefit of the extra time if it has the tobacco to sell. For example, assume warehouse A is allotted two hours, but sells out its tobacco in an hour and a half. Warehouse B, next in line, has been allotted two hours, but has more tobacco than it can sell within that time. Warehouse B can sell for its own two hours, and also use the half-hour unused by A.
The extent to which the second sale system allows a warehouseman to increase his sales by offering better service is limited by two factors. First, the market is "blocked" for about half the selling days, i.e., each warehouseman has more tobacco than he can sell in his allotted time. In addition, the basic allotment to each warehouseman remains the same from year to year so that no cumulative growth from second sales is possible. The floor-space system encourages expenditures for huge warehouses beyond efficient size and with no regard to the capacity needed to sell the market's tobacco.
7 6 It allows little room for merit to be rewarded, and places an undue premium on capital investment.
Despite these arguments against the floor-space system, it remains the most widely-used method of time allotment in the market today. The North Carolina Supreme Court has upheld the validity of this system under its state restraint of trade statute 77 but no federal court has as yet tested it.
Under the "unit system," selling time is allocated according to the number of warehouses in the market, each warehouse receiving the same allotment regardless of its floor space. This system also rules out the possibility of competitive growth opportunities from season to season, though the second sales allow some room for competitive activity within a given season. Similarly, the unit system encourages wasteful investment. An operator will expend money for several small warehouses in order to obtain a larger cumulative time allotment. E.2d 25 (1955) . Many permutations of these systems are possible. For instance, in Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 244 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1957) , the board used a "Unit Floor-Space System." Each warehouse got a unit of selling time for each 55,000 square feet of floor space (or less if the warehouse was smaller than 55,000 square feet).
A new system of allotment now utilized in a few markets is the "experience" or "historical" system. Each warehouseman gets time in relation to his proportion of the market's sales over the previous one or more years. Thus, if the market sold 100,000 baskets of tobacco, and of these he sold 10,000, he would get one-tenth of the market's selling time. This system does not result in any freeze of competitive conditions-there is a strong possibility of year-to-year growth or diminution in sales for each warehouseman. As a result several tribunals have found it to be reasonable and valid.
78
The system cannot start in a vacuum-the initial allotment must be based on sales under one of the other systems mentioned above. 7 However, "second sales" on days when the market is not blocked tend to bring the allotments of each competitor closer to what his services merit as each year brings a new computation. 0 A few boards have attempted to restrain this tendency by placing a percentage limit on the growth or decline of selling hours from year to year.
81
The federal tribunals considering these limitations have properly struck them down as unlawful.82 Of the four methods of time allocation considered, the floor-space and unit systems are more apt to stifle the free play of competition.83 The wall-to-wall system would seem to be a reasonable method so long as the warehouses in the market are not so large as to take over half a day to sell them out. The experience system seems to offer the best opportunity for a warehouseman's profit to be determined by competitive merit, so long as its operation is not artificially limited. N.C. 136, 87 S.E.2d 18 (1955) .
79. However, basing the initial year's allotment on the past few years' performance under one of the less competitive systems would seem to be preferable to trying to work out an involved formula for each market-based on units, floor space, and perhaps other factors. Such formulae would involve extended debate and probably be not much more, if at all, accurate.
80.
The new entrants in the Douglas, Georgia and Asheville, North Carolina markets improve their positions considerably through "second sales." Brief for the Plaintiff, p. 31, Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 244 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1957 83. Where the market is blocked only a very small percentage of the season, it may be that the second sale program offers reasonable opportunities for competition under these programs.
84. See note 80 supra for cases in which it has been so held.
The shift from the floor-space system to the experience system in some markets has been of recent origin. Operators were content with the floor-space system until the end of wartime building restrictions gave new competitors the opportunity to build additional facilities.
8 5 Since most of the markets used the floor-space system, the new entrants built huge warehouses, regardless of the cover-capacity of the market or the most efficient operating size, in an attempt to acquire a significant share of the selling time. When this happened, many boards attempted to limit the new entrant's competitive advantage by shifting to the experience system, where his floor space would not be such a crucial factor. Having switched to the experience system, the boards were confronted by a problem which would not exist under any of the other three methods-how to determine the new entrant's initial time allotment. 8 7 This problem has met with several solutions by individual boards, but it would appear that the best method is to allot time to the new warehouse by the unit method. Thus, if there are nine warehouses in the market before he builds, he would get one-tenth of the available selling time and the other operators would divide the remaining nine-tenths on the basis of the experience system. This method would encourage the new entrant to build a warehouse of the most efficient size, since he will be more 85. The board generally urges the new entrant to buy rather than build. This practice would not seem objectionable under the antitrust laws. In most fields the purchase of a going plant by a new entrant is not as beneficial to competition as the building of a new one, since the latter process results in greater productive capacity in the market. However, this assumes an elastic demand, and demand for tobaccomarketing facilities is relatively inelastic. In addition, the markets now contain four times the capacity needed to sell a season's production. Hendrickson, mipra note 14, at 12. The probability is that the least popular and efficient operator will be the one to sell, leaving the market in better competitive condition. One problem in this transaction would be how to figure the new entrants time allocation. If the experience system is in use on the market, it would seem best to allow the new entrant the selling time to which his vendor was entitled. This allotment may be small, if the vendor was comparatively unsuccessful. However, the selling price of the warehouse would be dependent in part upon the vendor's allotment of selling time, and under the experience system the buyer will have adequate opportunity to improve his position. Henderson and Sanford, both in North Carolina, adopted the experience system when newcomers entered the market; both have now returned to the unit system.
If the market uses either the floor-space or the unit system, the new entrant can determine his allotment by the manner in which he builds. For example, under the floor-space system, the larger the new warehouse the larger its time allotment. No court seems to have acted to prevent a board from changing its system to the prejudice of an entrant who has already built in reliance on the former system. Nor in view of the competitive advantage to be gained by a switch to the experience system should a court act to prevent it.
87. Under the other three systems, the new entrant's time allocation can be determined by the physical aspects of his building.
board of trade as a condition to participating in the business of operating a tobacco warehouse or the purchase of tobacco at auction therein." 91 The boards are also empowered to formulate and administer "reasonable rules and regulations for the economical and efficient handling of the sale of leaf tobacco." 92 If the regulations propounded by North Carolina boards, including requirements of membership in the local board as a condition to participating in the market, be considered as taking effect by action of the state in the exercise of its police power, there is authority to suggest that such regulation would not be subject to the antitrust laws. 93 However, if the statute is interpreted as merely authorizing certain private regulatory activities, such activity remains subject to the antitrust laws.4
Two decisions illustrate this difference. Parker v. Brown 15 involved a California statute which allowed raisin growers to agree to pool their product and regulate production and sale. These plans were then to be approved by a state administrative agency before they became effective. The Supreme Court found the Sherman Act to be inapplicable to the program on the ground that it was not effectuated by contract or conspiracy. 6 It was dependent on the approval of the state agency, and the state was subject only to the less restrictive limitations of the commerce clause. 97 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Co. 98 involved the enforceability against a non-signer of a resale price-fixing contract entered into pursuant to a state fair trade law. The Supreme Court held that this contract was subject to the Sherman Act, despite the fact that the price regulation was pursuant to authorization by the state.
99
The limitations imposed on state activity by the commerce clause differ from those imposed by the Sherman Act on private activity. In both cases the harm to interstate commerce must be analyzed and evaluated. However, the Sherman Act strikes down some regulations which would be lawful under the commerce clause were they state-imposed. 00 The justification for this difference in treatment seems to lie in the requirements of a federal system. State governments have the authority to regulate matters of local concern affecting the health, safety and welfare of their people. The legitimate exercise of this power in furtherance of such interests must be accommodated by the federal government in the exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce where the two are in conflict. The decisions of individuals, on the other hand, are generally directed to the promotion of their own interests and, therefore, the protection of commerce permits greater restriction of their behavior. While private regulation may in fact achieve a desirable public result, the risk that it will not justifies a closer control than would be required of a public body. Both the Parker and Schwegnunn cases involved regulation by individuals normally proscribed by the Sherman Act-in the former, restriction of production, and in the latter, retail price fixing. It would appear that the principal distinction between the two cases is the closer identification of the regulations with the local public interest which was achieved by the requirement of subsequent state approval of the raisin producers' regulations, as was required by the statute in Parker. In Schwegnuonn, the state ended its contact with the regulation with its legislative grant of power to the businessman; no agency of the state was required to make a finding that the price set by the individual was in keeping with the public interest.
The regulations of the tobacco warehousemen would appear to be more analogous to those in Schwegmann than to those in Parker v. Brown. The North Carolina statute requires that the regulations be directed to orderly and efficient marketing, which gives the state courts an opportunity to test them against the public interest when they are challenged, 102 whereas no standard was provided in Schwegnuann. But, the state has not provided for subsequent approval by an administrative agency, such as was the case in Parker, or for some form of administrative review. Judicial review cannot compare as a safeguard of the public interest with the Parker procedure. A regulation must be challenged rather than being automatically subjected to approval. The adjudicatory process is much slower and more costly. And all the persons whose interests are involved might not be adequately represented in such an adjudication. There is thus less assurance than in Parker that the warehousemen will enact regulations consistent with the public interest. 10 3 Since the danger is that these individuals will restrain trade for private gain, the regulations pursuant to this statute should be treated as acts of individuals authorized to engage in regulatory activity and not as acts of the state itself.
1°0 4 Thus, they should be evaluated by the standards of the antitrust laws, as are the regulations of boards in the other tobacco states. The danger to the public interest seems particularly great with respect to the authority conferred on the boards to require membership as a condition of participating in the market. Such power might easily
